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8 February 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence ✓
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director for Science & Technology
Deputy Director for Intelligence

FROM:

[Redacted]
Chief, Arms Control Intelligence Staff

SUBJECT: Results of SSCI Session (U)

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1. This "fast-track" memorandum is for your information and such action as you may instruct (see para 4 below). (U)

2. I participated in a session with the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) last Tuesday for about two hours. The key witness was Ambassador Paul Nitze. Col. John Gordon from State/PM was also a witness, to assist Ambassador Nitze. The subject was the talks in early March in Geneva between Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Gromyko. (S/NF)

3. The number of Senators in attendance was remarkably large, in my view. Although many subjects were discussed, the following key points, either as questions or statements, were made by the following Senators:

-- Senator Durenberger

SSCI is very interested in compliance questions, the dilemmas of verification, the nature of future arms control accords, the role of monitoring in verification, and the SSCI's cooperation with the Executive Branch in arms control subjects.

-- Senator Leahy (at beginning)

SSCI will play a key role in any arms control accords, both within the Senate and vis-a-vis the Executive Branch. The key question for any future strategic arms control agreement will be verification.

-- Senator Cohen

What is in these new negotiations for the Soviets? Why should the Soviets reduce weaponry?

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- Senator Roth It is important for the Executive Branch and the Senate to interact on arms control issues and to do so in confidence.
- Senator McConnell What is the value of the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) in Geneva, where compliance and other issues are discussed?
- Senator Murkowski What is this Government's compliance policy and what can we do about violations; i.e., to get the USSR back in compliance and minimize the damage to the arms control process?
- Senator Hollings Are we doing everything we can to negotiate with the USSR and to protect our national security?
- Senator Hatch How valuable will on-site inspection be in any arms control accords with the USSR?
- Senator Spector How serious are these violations and what does it tell us about Soviet behavior?
- Senator Boren Is SDI on the negotiating table and how will the US handle Soviet requests about SDI?
- Senator Bradley No comment.
- Senator Leahy (in
middle of session
and at end) Has policy guidance on verification been given out? Does the Executive Branch have a specific definition of verification or Statement of Principals? Was that material used with the Soviets in Geneva?
- Any arms control agreement with the Soviet Union has to be verifiable. Verification is the first and largest hurdle for any accord to pass.
- The Executive Branch must keep the SSCI informed about progress on verification and related issues. If a difference develops between the Committee and the

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Executive Branch, the President is going to have a very big problem. SSCI could be helpful to the Executive Branch. The record will remain open, and the SSCI will provide questions for written answers. (S/NF)

3. Frankly, the Executive Branch did not do very well in this session. The main reason, I gather, is that the State Liaison Officer was ill and SSCI interests were not passed by the State officer to Ambassador Nitze or to me. Moreover, General Chain decided at the last minute to not go with Ambassador Nitze to this session and Col. Gordon went as a substitute. Perhaps more importantly, I think the SSCI Staff knows how shaky the Administration's policy position on verification is, in fact. (S/NF)

4. As a result of this session, as described above, I believe it to be imperative that you engage Secretary Shultz, Secretary Weinberger and Bud McFarlane that the Executive Branch simply has to do a better job on verification and compliance issues. For example, in my opinion, if the President has any hope of delivering any meaningful strategic arms control arrangement with the USSR, even an extension of SALT II, the Executive Branch must get the SSCI actively engaged in a positive way. US intelligence is doing a lot in monitoring and other intelligence support areas, and the SSCI seems content with it. But the fact is that no matter how hard I try, as an intelligence officer, I cannot deliver the SSCI--much less HPSCI--on verification. (S/NF)

5. There are some important next steps. At various times in this session, various people told me privately or in public that they wanted to talk with me in the next week or so as follows:

- Senator Leahy regarding data denial;
- SSCI Staffer Keith Hall
- SSCI Staffer Mike Mattingly about monitoring judgments; and,
- SSCI Staffer Ed Levine about the SSCI study on telemetry. (S/NF)

6. Attached are copies of the draft Press Release from the session and a copy of Ambassador Nitze's statement, which I consider to be a very important document worth reading. (S/NF)

7. I hope this is helpful. If there is anything more I can do to assist you here, please call and let me know. (U)

Attachments:
As stated



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STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR PAUL H. NITZE
BEFORE THE
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
FEBRUARY 5, 1985

Mr. Chairman:

-- We are pleased to be with you this morning and to have the opportunity to discuss the meeting last month between Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Gromyko.

-- We are satisfied with the results of that meeting. As Secretary Shultz has said, our agreement to begin negotiations on the range of the most serious issues facing us is an important beginning.

-- It is our hope that we are now engaged in a process that can produce beneficial results for the United States and its Allies as well as the other side. This morning we would like to give you some thoughts on where we have come from, where we are, and where we would like to go.

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-- As we prepared for the January Geneva meeting, we conducted a careful and extensive review not only of the tactical questions facing us in those "talks about talks," but also of many of the broader issues and assumptions underlying both the current and future strategic balance.

-- In doing so, we were especially aware of the support and counsel that has been given; certainly the satisfactory result of that meeting would not have been achieved without the support of the Congress and our allies.

-- When the Secretary had met with NATO Ministers in early December, he was struck by the broad consensus of the Alliance as a whole on the wisdom of a U.S. approach to Geneva based on firmness and patience, and on our common need to resist excessive expectations and Soviet efforts to exploit Western hopes for progress.

-- For our part, our consultations with allies also provided another opportunity to reaffirm the high priority that we assign in any renewed nuclear arms control dialogue with the Soviets to achieving equitable and verifiable limitations on intermediate-range nuclear forces, those systems which pose the most immediate and direct threat to our Allies and friends in both Western Europe and Asia.

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-- In preparing for Geneva, we were conscious of the fact that although arms control would be the inevitable centerpiece of that particular meeting, it is only one part of a much broader U.S.-Soviet relationship, one involving a range of regional issues, bilateral problems, and human rights concerns as well.

-- As you are aware, the President has spoken on many occasions of our readiness to address this full agenda of East-West issues with the Soviets in a manner that might begin to put our relations on a more stable and productive basis. We have made our interest in constructive dialogue clear to the Soviets, and have put forward various suggestions to them on specific issues.

-- Despite the arms control focus of the Geneva meeting, we felt that it was important to use this opportunity to indicate to Gromyko not only those areas, such as arms control, where we believe progress is possible, but also to reiterate to him that forward progress will be possible only if the Soviets take into account our deep and serious concerns in other areas, particularly human rights.

-- As you are aware, ever since the Soviet Union disrupted the arms control dialogue when it walked out of the talks on strategic and intermediate-range nuclear forces at the end of 1983, we have pressed continually for a resumption of those negotiations. We looked forward to the Geneva meetings as a means to reanimate that dialogue.

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-- Thus, we went to Geneva prepared not only to explain to the Soviets the basic conceptual underpinning of our efforts to move the strategic relationship toward greater stability, but also to move expeditiously toward practical agreement on the subject and objectives of new negotiations on the full range of offensive nuclear and defensive arms -- including space arms -- and to agree on the appropriate negotiating format.

-- Both the President and the Secretary of State were satisfied with the result of the talks in Geneva and believe that it creates genuine opportunities for achieving concrete negotiating results -- results that will substantially reduce nuclear weapons while enhancing strategic stability. This satisfaction is particularly the case since we and the Soviets have now agreed that the formal negotiations will commence next month.

-- Mr. Chairman, I would now like to summarize the U.S. approach taken in Geneva; that approach will also form the foundation of our stance at the negotiating table.

-- Early in the Geneva meeting, the Secretary spoke to the overriding goals toward which the United States and the Soviet Union should work. The basic concept with which we went into the Geneva talks and which will guide our efforts during the upcoming formal negotiations can be summarized as follows:

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"During the next ten years, the U.S. objective is a radical reduction in the power of existing and planned offensive nuclear arms, as well as the stabilization of the relationship between offensive and defensive nuclear arms, whether on earth or in space. We are even now looking forward to a period of transition to a more stable world, with greatly reduced levels of nuclear arms and an enhanced ability to deter war based upon an increasing contribution to non-nuclear defenses against offensive nuclear arms. This period of transition could lead to the eventual elimination of all nuclear arms, both offensive and defensive. A world free of nuclear arms is an ultimate objective to which we, the Soviet Union, and all other nations can agree."

-- The Secretary began his substantive presentation to Gromyko with a review of the strategic situation. He emphasized that the United States was determined to maintain forces fully adequate to deter attack against the United States or our Allies. We expect the Soviet Union to have a comparable view. However, it is our belief that the strategic relationship can be made more stable and security maintained at significantly lower levels of armaments if the relationship is regulated through effective arms control.

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-- The Secretary discussed at length our views on the future strategic environment, including the relationship between offensive and defensive systems. This relationship lies at the heart of our approach to a stable strategic balance with the Soviets.

-- In the late 1960s and early 1970s, we negotiated measures that we hoped would be helpful to the security of each side. Those measures were based on three assumptions:

- (1) that with defensive systems severely limited, it would be possible to place comprehensive limits on strategic offensive forces and to establish a reliable deterrent balance at reduced levels;
- (2) that constraints on ballistic missile defenses would be such as to prevent break-out or circumvention; and
- (3) that both sides would adhere to the letter and spirit of the ABM Treaty.

-- The Secretary pointed out that these premises have come increasingly into question over the last decade. As you know, on the defensive side, the Soviet Union has taken full advantage of the ABM Treaty, has exploited technical ambiguities, and has also taken steps that, we believe, are not consistent with it. As an example, the Secretary raised our concern about the radar under construction at Krasnoyarsk.

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-- In the area of offensive nuclear forces, it has not proved possible to work out mutually acceptable agreements which would bring about meaningful reductions in the number and power of offensive nuclear forces, particularly in the most destabilizing categories of such forces.

-- The ABM Treaty signed in 1972 called for both sides to negotiate effective measures toward reductions in strategic arms, nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament. The Secretary made the point to Gromyko that for the immediate future we wish to work with the Soviet side to restore and make more effective the regime for reliable, mutual deterrence which, in 1972, we thought to be our common objective. This must involve the restoration of the efficacy of the assumptions upon which U.S.-USSR strategic dialogue was based.

-- During the course of the meetings, the Secretary and National Security Advisor McFarlane explained at some length how the President has set as a major objective for the coming decade the determination of whether new defensive technologies can make it feasible to move away from a situation in which security is based almost exclusively on the threat of devastating nuclear retaliation.

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-- The Secretary stressed to Gromyko that in a future situation in which both of our countries could shift their deterrent posture toward greater reliance on effective non-nuclear forces, including defenses against nuclear offensive arms, defense could be more stable than the current situation.

-- The Secretary went on to explain what is already familiar to you -- that our effort to explore this possibility through the Strategic Defense Initiative is at present strictly a research effort and is being conducted in full conformity with the ABM Treaty. The Secretary noted that no decisions to move beyond research have been taken, and, were a defensive technology to be validated by research, the United States would expect to discuss with the Soviets and our Allies, well in advance of any action, the basis on which it might be integrated into force structures.

-- The Secretary stated to Gromyko that we believe any attempt to ban research would be neither effective nor verifiable. It will, moreover, be several years before this research will enable us to determine the relative feasibility and desirability of particular defensive technologies.

-- Nonetheless, the Secretary noted, we were prepared to discuss now the question of defenses, both future and existing, as well as the question of the current and future strategic relationship.

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-- At the conclusion of the Secretary's opening presentation, Gromyko commented that this was an important and principled statement on our part.

To turn now to the U.S. presentation regarding negotiations:

-- The immediate task of the meeting was to agree on new negotiations on nuclear and space arms. The Secretary made clear to the Soviets that we were prepared to agree on the subject and objectives of negotiations on the full range of offensive nuclear and defensive arms -- including space arms -- and to agree to appropriate negotiating fora.

-- He made clear that we were ready to address all issues, and that we would prefer three separate negotiating fora, covering strategic nuclear arms, intermediate-range nuclear forces, and defensive and space arms. Most importantly, we wanted to establish the necessary fora in order to get on with the task of reducing nuclear arms and enhancing the stability of the strategic balance

The Secretary also summarized our substantive positions on the various issues

-- On START, he said we were prepared to go beyond where we left off in the last round, and to explore trade-offs that would accommodate asymmetries between the force structures of the sides.

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-- On INF, he stated that, while adhering to the principles we had previously set forth, we were prepared to build upon the flexibility inherent in our Fall 1983 proposal and to explore possible new approaches as well.

-- He also made clear that we expected both sides to address "space arms" issues in the defensive and space arms forum.

-- The Secretary emphasized our willingness to consider Soviet proposals, on both substance and format. Both sides would be able fully to present and negotiate mutually acceptable outcomes.

Gromyko's Presentation

-- For his part Gromyko was serious, businesslike and forceful in asserting known Soviet positions in his presentation -- on most matters of substance he stuck close to a relatively predictable script. He spoke along familiar lines of Soviet desires for an improvement in relations and for resumed negotiations, and asserted that it was U.S. actions which were endangering stability.

-- Not surprisingly, he reiterated at some length Soviet arguments on the dangers of SDI and the need for a sweeping "prevention of militarization of space" through negotiations to ban all "space attack weapons." He defined "space attack weapons" as those based on any physical principle, regardless of basing mode, which are designed to attack targets in space

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or targets on earth from space. In the Soviet view, he said, systems that the U.S. defined as defensive were elements of an "offensive plan" to achieve a first-strike capability.

-- On strategic arms, Gromyko spoke of Soviet readiness to consider "radical reductions" and the renunciation of new types of strategic weapons, such as long-range cruise missiles, ICBMs, SLBMs and bombers. He was unwilling to give any specifics. It was, therefore, not clear whether the Soviets have accepted "radical reductions" in the sense that we have proposed. The offer to renounce new types of strategic weapons appears to be little more than a repackaging of the Soviet nuclear freeze proposal.

-- On INF, Gromyko repeated familiar elements of the Soviet position, e.g., that U.S. LRINF missiles are "strategic systems" and that British and French systems must be taken into account. As expected, he called for a halt to U.S. deployments and Soviet "countermeasures," to be followed by "reductions to agreed levels" on medium-range missiles in Europe. He did not demand withdrawal of already deployed U.S. missile systems as a precondition for negotiations. It is unclear whether his formulation would rule out the possibility of an agreement permitting some U.S. deployments.

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-- Gromyko, as expected, stressed the interrelationship between these issues, conditioning Soviet acceptance of reductions in strategic and intermediate-range nuclear forces on our acceptance of a ban on "space attack weapons," and drawing a linkage between strategic and intermediate-range forces.

-- On the structure of the negotiations, Gromyko suggested that the Soviets would like to divide the subject matter along three lines: strategic, medium-range and space attack arms. To some extent this structure paralleled our own, though Gromyko linked the fora closely, emphasizing their interrelationship.

The U.S. Response and the Agreement

-- After hearing Gromyko's initial presentation, the Secretary concentrated our efforts on obtaining agreement to follow-on negotiations.

-- The degree of overlap between us on both procedures and substance proved sufficient during intensive discussion to permit the agreement on subject, objectives and procedures registered in the Joint Statement.

-- Three elements stand out:

(1) With regard to the subject of negotiations, we agreed that it will be a complex of questions concerning space and nuclear arms -- both strategic and intermediate-range -- to be considered and resolved in their interrelationship.

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(2) With regard to the objective of negotiations, we will seek effective agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on earth, at limiting and reducing nuclear arms, and at strengthening strategic stability.

(3) There is necessarily a degree of ambiguity in these formulations.

-- To take one example, the subject matter that each of the three groups will address is not precisely defined. To take another, it is not determined in advance how the delegations will conduct their work.

-- We do not underestimate the differences between us. These are important questions, and the negotiations will be neither quick nor easy.

-- Among the differences that may persist for some time is the subject matter of the forum which will deal with defensive and space arms. While the joint statement does not refer to the "non-militarization" of space, the Soviets can be expected to make a major effort to make this the subject matter of negotiations in this forum. For our part, we intend to address not only space but also other defensive arms in this negotiation. As I have noted, the Soviet view is that systems we call "defensive" are seen from their viewpoint as "offensive."

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-- While the extent to which the Soviets are willing to put their own extensive defensive systems and programs on the table remains to be seen, they did agree that "space arms" include ABM systems. *(perhaps ICBM sys only, not Galosh; not Audo, old S48)*

-- We consider it to be expected that there would remain important differences at this early stage of what is likely to be a protracted process. But they did not prevent us from agreeing to sit down and engage the process of resolving them.

-- That, we think, is probably the most important achievement of the Geneva talks: recognition by both countries that there is a difference between defining the subjects and objectives of negotiations, as they agreed to do in their joint announcement of November 22, and prejudicing the results of negotiations before negotiations begin.

Summary

-- While we are pleased with the outcome of the Geneva talks, particularly since we are now preparing for formal negotiations to begin on March 12, it is important that we continue to keep our expectations in check and that we prepare ourselves and the public for long and difficult negotiations.

-- We need to guard against euphoria, just as we previously needed to counter unrealistic pessimism.

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-- It was, of course, only a little over one year ago that following the Soviet walk-out, we were deluged with predictions of a new ice age in East-West relations and an end to all arms control.

-- Now we risk a similar flood of expectations of early, prompt progress in the new negotiations.

-- Our agreement in Geneva has not changed our complicated and genuinely competitive relationship with the Soviets. If anything, the Secretary's discussion with Gromyko confirmed that these new negotiations will be difficult ones.

-- As has been described to you, the Soviets made a major effort to establish an interrelationship between those areas of the negotiation where they will try to use Western interest in prompt progress in the negotiations as leverage.

-- The fact that Gromyko has agreed to these new talks does not mean that the Soviets are ready to drop their unacceptable substantive positions at the table, or to give up their propaganda campaign outside the conference room.

-- It is likely, therefore, that in the new negotiations the Soviets will at some time attempt to hold progress on intermediate-range and strategic nuclear arms hostage to our movement in the space forum where they clearly want to inhibit the U.S. research program on strategic defense.

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-- In doing so, they will seek every opportunity to exploit any divisions within the NATO Alliance and the United States.

-- Just as in 1983, Moscow will attempt to appeal to Western publics over the heads of Western governments. I am confident that, as in 1983, they will fail; this will, of course, require a coordinated effort on our part to ensure that the Soviets are forced to conclude that there is no alternative to serious negotiation.

-- Since the Soviets walked out of the Geneva talks in late 1983, we have made clear that we were ready to return without preconditions. One can only speculate on what prompted the Soviets to join us in new negotiations without insisting on a number of things they have very strongly promoted in the interim.

-- One plausible motive, however, is that they wished to recreate the instrument for putting pressure on the United States that negotiations uniquely provide. Their walk-out had obviously made it more difficult for them to mobilize public opinion in Europe and America against the U.S. approach on a whole range of security and arms control issues.

-- We can expect them to use the fact of negotiations to argue once again that U.S. programs and approach will jeopardize the prospects for success in the negotiations.

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-- We believe that the argument is baseless. On the contrary: just as Alliance solidarity and the strength of support in the Congress for the U.S. defense modernization effort at home and abroad are key factors in explaining our success thus far, we believe that they will be critical to the prospects of achieving the kind of effective and verifiable arms control agreements that we hope will emerge from the process that is about to begin.

-- For these reasons it would be unwise to reverse course and curtail our commitment to our strategic modernization programs, particularly the MX missile. To do so would send a signal of weakness and lack of resolve to the Soviet Union at just the time when we need to show strength of commitment and unity of purpose.

-- It would also be most unwise to curtail research into strategic defenses. This research, fully consistent with the ABM Treaty, is a down-payment on a future we all hope we can achieve -- the radical reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons. As such, it is a vital part of our coherent national security program, both modernization and arms control.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

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